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ANTITRUST LAW: SUPREME COURT HOLDS UNREASON-
ABLE SECURITIES EXCHANGE REGULATION OF NON-
MEMBER TO BE VIOLATION OF SHERMAN ACT
THE modern securities exchange has attributes of both the govern-
mental agency and private enterprise. This character is the product
of a regulatory scheme based on a policy of delegating the detailed
regulation to those actually engaged in the securities industry.' Al-
though founded on substantial considerations, 2 the duty of self-regu-
lation may often conflict with policies advanced by antitrust legisla-
tion.3 The practical and conceptual difficulties of resolving such a
conflict are illustrated by Silver v. New York Stock Exch.4
Government regulation is basically imposed by two statutes: the
Securities Exchange Act of 19345 imposes a duty of self-regulation on
exchanges, while the Maloney Act of 19386 provides for regulation
' See generally Westwood & Howard, Self-Government in the Securities Business,
17 LA v & CONTEMP. PROB. 518 (1952).
2 The fundamental regulatory policy is the maintenance of public confidence in
the securities industry. Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 349-52, 355
(1963). "Extensive reliance on self-regulation rests on two principal premises; first,
it provides an alternative to a much more pervasive direct regulation by the Govern-
ment, which would be expensive to the taxpayers and burdensome to the industry,
and it also provides a more sensitive and effective device for regulation in the area of
unethical as distinct from illegal conduct." S. REP. No. 379, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 24
(1963). See also S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 13; H. R. REP. No. 1383,
73d Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1934).
3Antitrust legislation is designed to foster competition. On the other hand, as
competition in industries such as electrical power distribution would result in eco-
nomic waste, the public interest is best protected by statutory monopoly. Where
limited competition is approved, an exemption from antitrust laws is necessary. For
example, persons affected by orders of the Civil Aeronautics Board are relieved from
application of antitrust laws, insofar as necessary to conform to the order. 72 Stat.
770 (1958), 49 U.S.C. § 1385 (1958). Resolution of the regulated industry-antitrust
conflict requires a determination of the extent to which competition should be sacri-
ficed to achieve the policies advanced by regulation. See generally Schwartz, Legal
Restriction of Competition in the Regulated Industries: An Abdication of Judicial
Responsibility, 67 HARv. L. Rxv. 436 (1954); Comment, 58 COLum. L. REv. 673 (1958).
4373 U.S. 341 (1963).
'48 Stat. 881 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1958). This act requires securities
exchanges to register with the Securities Exchange Commission. As a prerequisite to
registration, an exchange must submit and agree to enforce acceptable rules govern-
ing the conduct of its members. Although the SEC oversees the self-regulation of
the exchanges, the NYSE rules do not provide for SEC review of Exchange disciplinary
actions. See 2 Loss, SEcuRrrms RzULATiON 1165-1275 (1961).
- 52 Stat. 1070 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3 (1958). The scope of self-regulation in
the securities industry was broadened significantly by the Maloney Act. The significant
difference in the manner of regulation as compared to the Securities Act of 1934 is
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of dealers in the over-the-counter market. The scope of the statutes
is not self-evident, however, as complex interrelationships have de-
veloped between exchange members and over-the-counter dealers.
New York Stock Exchange rules, by specifically prescribing conduct
to be followed by its members when dealing with non-members,
attempt to clarify the respective rights of parties. The Exchange,
acting in accordance with these rules,7 granted non-member Silver
tentative approval for a direct wires connection between his offices
and those of several Exchange members. When the Exchange's cus-
tomary investigation revealed several questionable facets of Silver's
background, the tentative approval was withdrawn. There was no
hearing nor were the reasons for the Exchange's action communi-
cated to Silver.
As neither NYSE rules nor Securities Exchange Commission pro-
cedure provided administrative relief, Silver sought relief in the
courts.9 Reasoning that the Securities Exchange Act did not extend
to non-members and that there was no implied exemption from anti-
trust laws for dealings with non-members, the district court0 found
that the Maloney Act provides for review by the Securities Exchange Commission of
disciplinary actions taken by the dealers associations, 52 Stat. 1070 (1938), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78o-3 (h) (1958), and contains an exemption from antitrust legislation. 52 Stat. 1070
(1938), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3 (n) (1958). See generally Westwood & Howard, supra note 1,
at 526; Loss, op. cit. supra note 5, at 1277-1392.
7The Exchange acted pursuant to article III, § 6 of its constitution and Exchange
rules 355, 356 and 358. Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 196 F. Supp. 209, 213 (S.D.N.Y.
1961). After the district court decision the Exchange suspended rule 355, making it
clear that rules providing for discontinuance of any means of communication applied
only to communication facilities between offices of the same member firm. Loss, op.
cit. supra note 5 (Supp. 1962, at 39).
8A direct wire provides connection with other traders in the over-the-counter
market by a flip of the switch. Offers to buy and sell can thereby be communicated
within a matter of seconds. Although the same information can be obtained by
conventional telephone service, the direct wire is faster. See Silver v. New York Stock
Exch., supra note 7, at 223-24.
0 The policy of first allowing the agency to consider the case is known as the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction. See 3 DAvis, ADMIISnTRATIvE LAW 19.01-.09 (1958);
Comment, 38 N.Y.U.L. Rxv. 593, 594 n.4 (1963).
As the question of primary jurisdiction was left open in Silver, 373 U.S. at 358
n.12, it remains uncertain whether the possibility of relief from either the NYSE or
the SEC would preclude judicial consideration of a similar case. In Pan Am.
World Airways, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 296 (1963), the Court held that the
Civil Aeronautics Board had exclusive primary jurisdiction concerning approval of
mergers. In view of the broad interpretation which the Court is apparently willing
to give statutes conferring jurisdiction upon the various administrative agencies, the
Court, in cases similar to Silver, would probably require a plaintiff to exhaust existing
administrative remedies before resorting to the judiciary.
10 Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 196 F. Supp. 209 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). The district
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the withdrawal by the Exchange to be a per sel violation of section
1 of the Sherman Act.12 The Court of Appeals' 3 reversed on the
theory that the scope of the duties imposed on exchanges by the
Securities Exchange Act did extend to non-members and further-
more, that exemption from antitrust laws was implied as essential
to effective self-regulation. 4 The Supreme Court, rejecting the rea-
soning of the lower courts, held that the solution lay in reconciling
"the operation of both statutory schemes rather than holding one
completely ousted."' 5  Although holding the per se doctrine in-
applicable, the Court nevertheless found an antitrust violation. Ap-
plying the Rule of Reason, 16 the Court found that the Exchange's
court granted a summary judgment enjoining the Exchange from prohibiting opera-
tion of private wire connections between plaintiff's offices and defendant's member
firms. The District Court also concluded that the Exchange was liable for treble
damages under the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 731 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 15
(1958), such damages to be determined at trial.
"
1 Although the Sherman Act has been interpreted to proscribe only unreasonable
restraints of trade, "there are certain agreements or practices which, because of their
pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue, are conclusively
presumed to be unreasonable and, therefore, illegal without elaborate inquiry as to
the precise harm they have caused or the business excuse for their use." Northern
Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958). See, e.g., United States v. Parke, Davis
& Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960) (price fixing); Klor's Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359
U.S. 207 (1959) (group boycott); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S.
150 (1940) (price fixing). See generally Loevinger, The Rule of Reason in Antitrust
Law, 7 PRAc. LAW., Nov. 1961, pp. 17, 19-21; Montague, Per Se Illegality and the Rule
of Reason, 12 A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECT. 69 (1958).
12 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1958).
x3 Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 302 F.2d 714 (2d Cir. 1962).
I' It is a basic doctrine that repeal of antitrust laws by implication is not favored.
See, e.g., California v. FPC, 369 U.S. 482, 485 (1962); Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R.,
324 U.S. 439, 456-57 (1945); United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188 (1939). See also
ATr'Y. GEN. NAT'L COMM. ANTITRUST REP. 261-62 (1955).
15 373 U.S. at 357. "When there are two acts on the same subject, the rule is to give
effect to both, if possible." United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 198 (1939).
Accord, General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. United States, 286 U.S. 49, 61-62 (1932);
Henderson's Tobacco, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 652, 657 (1870); United States v. Tynen, 78
U.S. (11 Wall.) 88, 92 (1870).
" The Sherman Act was interpreted in early decisions as proscribing all combina-
tions which restrained trade. However in Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S.
1 (1911) the Court held that only actions which unreasonably restrained trade were
illegal. "The Rule of Reason opens the way to reliance upon a broad range of dis-
cretion in weighing the evidence of defenses of justification compatible with the
purposes of the antitrust statutes. The Rule of Reason operates through a process
of inclusion and exclusion in a case-by-case consideration of all the facts. The per se
illegality doctrine operates by conveiting predetermined single fact categories into fixed
rules of Law." Oppenheim, Federal Antitrust Legislation: Guideposts to a Revised
National Antitrust Policy, 50 MIcH. L. REv. 1139, 1151-52 (1952). See also Adams, "The




action could not be justified as a valid exercise of its regulatory duty
and was, therefore, a violation of the Sherman Act.'7
Recent precedent holding concerted refusals to deal illegal per se
under the Sherman Act posed the initial problem for the Court.1s
As action of the Exchange is necessarily that of a group, the dealings
with Silver were particularly susceptible to the Sherman Act pro-
scriptions of group boycotts. Yet, to hold, as did the district court,
that the conduct was "extrinsically unreasonable"'19 not only pro-
scribes inquiry into the complex policy factors involved but goes
far to frustrate the ability of exchanges to effectuate regulation. 0
The Court stated that the Exchange's conduct "would, had it
occurred in a context free from federal regulation, constitute a per
se violation .... ,"21 This language would appear to be indicative of
17 373 U.S. at 361-67.
"
0Concerted refusals to deal (group boycotts) were first held illegal per se in
Fashion Originator's Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941). Subsequent cases strengthened
the doctrine's applicability to fact situations similar to that in Silver. E.g., Radiant
Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas, Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1961); Klor's Inc. v.
Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959). Although strict adherence to the
per se doctrine does not allow any consideration of the reasonableness of the boycott,
in many cases group boycotts were found to be reasonable after examination of the
respective policies involved. E.g., Molinas v. National Basketball Ass'n, 190 *F. Supp.
241 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) (league suspension of professional basketball player not unreason-
able); United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621, 689 (S.D.N.Y. 1953) (group action
by investment bankers not unreasonable).
As to the favor which the courts have shown for the per se doctrine, one writer
has said: "The steady advance of the per se doctrine, if continued, threatens to dilute
the Rule of Reason to the point where it will be so limited in scope as to apply only
in exceptional cases. . . . While there are still some areas in which the Rule of
Reason is applied, there is an unmistakable danger that [the Rule of Reason will be
reduced] to a ghostly hue without corporeal substance." Oppenheim, supra note 16, at
1156.
On the other hand, it has been urged that the per se doctrine is preferable as it
adds certainty to the law. Schwartz, The Schwartz Dissent, 1 ANTITRUST BULL. 37
(1955.)
10 Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 196 F. Supp. 209, 224 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
2oAt present, over-the-counter dealers are primarily regulated by the Maloney Act,
supra note 6. However, if an exchange subject to SEC review can reasonably refuse to
deal with an erring non-member, the SEC has an additional means through which
non-members can be regulated. Note, 71 YALE L.J. 748, 756 (1962). Per se
liability would conclusively presume that exchanges could not reasonably refuse to
deal with non-members, for under the per se doctrine, the refusal to deal is itself
unlawful and underlying reasons are not examined. Silver v. New York Stock Exch.,
196 F. Supp. 209, 224-25 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). See also Oppenheim, supra note 16, at 1151;
Barber, Refusals to Deal Under the Federal Antitrust Laws, 103 U. PA. L. REv. 847,
875 (1955).
By declining to apply the per se doctrine, the Court preserved this mode of regula-
tion and, by requiring fair dealings with non-members under penalty of antitrust
liability, minimized the possibility of misuse of the powers given the Exchange.
21373 U.S. at 347.
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a desire to preserve application of the per se doctrine in future cases
involving defendants subject to less extensive government regulation.
If the court's inquiry reveals no potential conflict with the basic
regulatory scheme, the per se rule should be applied as in the ordi-
nary commercial context. For instance, government regulation
which provides limited rate controls would not, in most instances, be
a basis for avoiding the per se rule where the defendant has conspired
to fix prices.2 2 In cases such as Silver, however, the imposition of
per se liability would upset the basic regulatory pattern.23
Since there was no conclusive presumption of liability for the
withdrawal of the wire service, the Court turned to problems of
possible exemption from antitrust- legislation and reasonableness of
the Exchange's action. The Court recognized an implied exemption
from antitrust laws, restricted, however, to "particular instances of
exchange self-regulation which fall within the scope and purposes of
the Securities Exchange Act .... " 24 Accordingly, the Court reasoned
that the denial of a hearing to Silver was such an unreasonable prac-
tice as not to advance the purposes of the act and hence, was not
within the scope of the exemption.2 5 The Court then declined to
inquire into the merits of the Exchange's justification for the initial
withdrawal of the wire service.20 Thus, antitrust laws were used to
remedy this defect in procedural safeguards.
As Silver illustrates, the broad scope of antitrust legislation makes
it easily adaptable to remedy varied grievances.2  It may be benefi-
22 In Pennsylvania Water & Power Co. v. Consolidated Gas, Elec. Light & Power
Co. 184 F.2d 552 (4th Cir. 1950), the court rejected the argument that the per se
rule could not be applied because the defendant was subject to regulation. Antitrust
liability would not interfere with regulation as the Federal Power Commission could
only prevent unreasonable and discriminatory pricing of electric power sold in inter-
state commerce. 41 Stat. 1073 (1920), 16 U.S.C. § 813 (1958).
23 See note 20 supra.
-' 373 U.S. at 361.
2r, 373 U.S. at 365.
2In declining to inquire into the substantive justification for the initial with-
drawal of the wire service, the Court cited several cases for the proposition that "sub-
stantive inquiry after the fact cannot possibly succeed in accurately ascertaining
retrospectively what the outcome would have been had the procedural safeguards
been afforded in the first instance." 373 U.S. at 365 n.18. For discussion of cases on
this point, see Annot., 21 A.L.R. 2d 1402, 1444 (1952).
The existence of a conspiracy to boycott Silver is not an automatic basis for treble
damages. The damages must be proven to have been a direct and proximate result
of the defendant's actions. See, e.g., Buckeye Powder Co. v. E. I. DuPont de Ncmours
Powder Co., 248 U.S. 55 (1918); Virtue v. Creamery Package Mfg. Co., 227 U.S. 8
(1913); Royster Drive-in-Theaters, Inc. v. American Broadcasting-Paramount Theaters,
Inc., 268 F.2d 246 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 885 (1959).
27In Duplex Printing Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921), the Supreme Court
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cial for a plaintiff to frame a traditional grievance as an antitrust vio-
lation in order to obtain injunctive relief28 and possibly treble dam-
ages. 29 Moreover, as antitrust pleadings would be based on a federal
statute, a plaintiff otherwise deprived of federal jurisdiction may
have a basis for bringing his suit into the federal court.30 Also, anti-
trust pleadings might afford the plaintiff an easier burden of proof,
particularly where the per se doctrine is applicable. 31
The immediate benefit of using antitrust laws to remedy the
grievance in the instant case might be overshadowed, however, to
the extent that the threat of treble damages inhibits the Exchange
from strictly exercising its disciplinary duty. On the other hand, the
Exchange might avoid liability in similar cases by adopting, through
amendment of the Exchange rules, a hearing and review procedure
similar to that included in the Maloney Act.3 2 Such an amendment
with pervasive review by the SEC, could add certainty to the Ex-
extended antitrust laws to labor problems by holding that picketing by non-employee
union members violated the Sherman Act. Although § 20 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat.
738 (1914), 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1958), restricted injunctive relief in labor disputes between
employer' and employee, the Court gave the statute a narrow interpretation in allowing
relief. Congressional dissatisfaction was expressed through the Norris-LaGuardia Act
§ 1, 47 Stat. 70 (1932), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 101 (1958), which, proscribed future
application of injunctive remedies under antitrust laws in all labor disputes.
Similarly, in McCann v. New York Stock Exch., 107 F.2d 908 (2d Cir. 1939), the
plaintiff sought recovery under the Sherman Act although his grievance was in
substance a defamation claim. Tacitly recognizing the collateral problems resulting
from the proposed application of the antitrust laws, Learned Hand, J., affirming a
judgment for the defendant, stated that the antitrust allegations were "out of place"
in view of the nature of the grievance. Id. at 912 (dictum). Thus, although 'the
result of the Exchange's action was to injure the plaintiff's business, the court con-
sidered the case on its merits, as a defamation claim, and held that dissemination of
the truth about the plaintiff was not a basis for antitrust liability.
21 There are specific provisions in the antitrust laws affording, injunctive relief.
26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 4 (1958); 38 Stat. 736, 737 (1890), as
amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 25-26 (1958).
Although there are several instances in which a plaintiff may be able to obtain
injunctive relief in any court, the statutory injunctive relief provided by the anti-
trust laws obviates the necessity of a plaintiff's showing lack of adequate remedy at law.
29 Under the Clayton Act, § 4, 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1958), treble
damages can be recovered for antitrust violations.
a3 "The district courts shall have ... jurisdiction . . . wherein the matter in con-
Itroversy . . . arises under ... the . . . laws . . . of the United States." 62 Stat. 930
(1948), as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (a) (1958). Moreover where a cause of action is
based solely on antitrust laws, the federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction. See, e.g.,
Caraway v. Ford Motor Co., 144 F. Supp. 295 (W.D. Mo. 1956); Southern States Oil
Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 26 F. Supp. 633 (E.D.S.C. 1939).
O"See note 11 supra.
32 Section 19 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 48 Stat. 898 (1934), 15 U.S.C. §
78s (b) (1958), provides that the Securities Exchange Commission may make changes
in the rules of an exchange. The Maloney Act requires notice and hearings in all
disciplinary proceedings. 52 Stat. 1070 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3 (b) (9) (1958).
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change's disciplinary actions, as administrative decisions supported
by substantial evidence will not be judicially reversed.33 Adoption
of a non-member hearing rule, however, without more, would not
guarantee insulation from antitrust liability, for the Court expressly
left open the question of liability where there was a provision for a
hearing and administrative appeal.
In addition, such an amendment itself presents practical prob-
lems as the Exchange would lack both full subpoena power and the
protection of a privilege against defamation claims.8 4 The lack of
adequate subpoena power would obviously hinder both the Ex-
change and the accused in presenting witnesses. Moreover, the lack
of privilege might well inhibit witnesses who could otherwise
willingly testify. The resulting inability of the Exchange to pro-
duce substantial proof of offenses would frustrate the policy of dele-
gated regulation. Neither could the Exchange safely refuse to give
a hearing in anticipation of introducing such evidence in an anti-
trust action, for under the Silver doctrine, the court may decline to
consider even the most overwhelming evidence. 5  Thus it seems
clear that if exchange regulation of non-members is to continue with
any degree of effectiveness, further legislation is needed. Although
the vesting of adequate privilege and subpoena power in the Ex-
change is subject to the objection that it would place excessive and
essentially governmental power in private hands, provision for SEC
control and review power would prevent abuse. On the other hand,
to place the primary authority over such disputes in the SEC rather
than in the Exchange would frustrate the legislative policy that regu-
lation should be delegated to the exchanges.8 6
3 The decisions of administrative agencies are subject to judicial review according
to the Administrative Procedure Act § 10. 60 Stat. 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009 (1958).
Section 10 (e) of the act precludes judicial reversal of agency findings unless they are
supported by substantial evidence. See, e.g., Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340
U.S. 474 (1951); 4 DAvis, AD MINsTRATwVE LAw, 29.02-.04 (1958). Strictly speaking,
exchanges are not administrative agencies. Only action involving SEC discretion
could be said to be a decision of an administrative agency. However, even without
SEC discretion, the administrative role of the NYSE would appear to be sufficiently
analogous to warrant application of the substantial evidence rule.
8, Subpoena powers are reserved to the SEC by § 21 (b) of the Securities Exchange
Act, 48 Stat. 899 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78u (b) (1958). The Court recognized
that the Exchange would have only a qualified privilege, but suggested that defama-
tion liability could be minimized by confining the hearing to parties to the dispute
and necessary witnesses, 378 U.S. at 862 n.14.
'5 378 U.S. at 365. See note 26 supra.
3' See note 2 supra.
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